As the U.S. rebalances towards the Asia-Pacific, strategists and force planners will grapple with how to best pursue American policy objectives in the region. Financial constraints will limit their available means, placing additional importance on the creative use of existing resources. However, concepts rooted in years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations-if unquestioningly transferred to the Asia-Pacific-risk becoming cognitive strictures that limit strategic imagination. This monograph aims to broaden joint force thinking on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). It begins by defining ISR and differentiating it from intelligence writ large. Next, borrowing from airpower theory, it explores the relationship between ISR and strategy, concluding that ISR is an astrategic activity that may bring about strategic effects in three fundamental ways-by informing strategy-making, by enabling necessary tactics, and by favorably shaping the operational environment. The paper then examines each ISR way against available historical evidence. Recommendations to improve the efficacy of ISR in the Asia-Pacific and beyond complete the essay. The project introduces several novel concepts, including ISR's astrategic character, ISR's three ways to cause strategic effect, ISR diplomacy, and ISR's observer-effect.
Introduction
On the morning of April 1, 2001, a crippled U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft lumbered toward China's Hainan Island with 24 American souls aboard. Moments earlier, in international airspace above the South China Sea, the EP-3E Aries II-a turboprop-driven intelligence collection platform-improbably survived an accidental mid-air collision with an intercepting Chinese jet fighter plane.
1 According to survivor accounts, the Chinese naval pilot, Wang Wei, probably misjudged relative speed and distance while performing an aggressive aerial maneuver known as "thumping." The Chinese F-8II, flying immediately beneath the EP-3, pitched up closely in front of the reconnaissance aircraft-too closely-sheering off the EP-3's nose and scattering a debris plume that the larger aircraft's engines ingested. The EP-3 fell approximately 10,000 feet while its pilot struggled to regain control of the machine. The Chinese naval pilot was less fortunate-his F-8 broke apart and plummeted into the waters below.
2
The tactical miscue presented President George W. Bush's administration its first serious international test. For 11 days People's Republic of China (PRC) authorities detained the EP-3 crew and their aircraft, demanding an apology, reparations, and the cessation of U.S.
reconnaissance flights along China's coastline. Rhetoric escalated and nationalistic emotions simmered in both Washington and Beijing. But, there was more to lose than gain by a prolonged stand-off and statesmen on both sides moved to defuse the situation. In relatively short order, U.S. leaders publicly expressed regret for Wang's fate and the Chinese repatriated both the EP-3 crew and, later, the plane itself.
The 2001 EP-3 incident momentarily focused the attention of U.S. policymakers and military strategists on both Sino-American relations and the subordinate role of U.S. airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in the Asia-Pacific. What should taboo. New estimations of the threat environment and needed capabilities are not just tolerated, they are encouraged. Additionally, the long-term security challenges posed by a substantial national debt make cuts to defense spending politically feasible. 6 Post-war periods are often characterized by smaller defense budgets, even more so when fiscal solvency dominates national discourse.
A fourth factor-the increasingly muscular behavior of a rising China and the wariness it causes among neighbors-imbues security discussions with a sense of urgency. As one recent example, in November 2013 the PRC unilaterally announced an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over a portion of the East China Sea that overlaps with an existing Japanese ADIZ and includes airspace above the disputed island chain known as Senkaku in Tokyo and Diaoyu in
Beijing. 7 The Chinese promised unspecified defensive measures in response to uncoordinated flights through the ADIZ, and in the days following the declaration air components of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)-along with their Japanese and South Korean counterpartsstepped up airborne surveillance and interceptions in the area. China's latest irredentist assertion and martial actions increase the probability of a tactical-level miscalculation along its contested periphery that, in turn, risks stoking the region's hyper-nationalistic predilections and drawing
careless statesmen into open conflict. However, Senkaku, and the like, also create opportunities for large-minded leaders and clear-sighted strategists to manage conflict-ideally before it occurs-using various means of statecraft, including ISR.
Thesis
This monograph examines the ways of ISR in the context of the Asia-Pacific rebalance.
It begins by defining relevant terms and differentiating ISR from intelligence writ large. Next, borrowing from airpower theory, it explores the relationship between ISR and strategy, identifying three fundamental ways that ISR activities may cause strategic effect. The essay sketches each ISR way in some detail and surveys historical evidence to refine the concepts. The penultimate section recommends improvements to U.S. military doctrine and ISR employment in the Asia-Pacific. A summary concludes the paper. In the final analysis, ISR may cause strategic effects in three ways-by collecting to inform strategy-making; by collecting to enable the execution of strategy; and, by favorably shaping the operational environment directly. If this essay adds modestly to a more expansive and nuanced understanding of ISR, it will have succeeded.
Intelligence and ISR
Any examination of ISR must first begin with some circumscription of the concept.
What is meant by ISR? There is no consensus definition of intelligence, so it should be unsurprising that ISR is also understood diversely. 8 At its most superficial, ISR is the aggregation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. More accurately, it is the reassociation of functions which diverged accidently in the U.S. military-and Air Force specifically-counterproductively ossifying over time into distinct organizations and cultures.
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Despite the presence of the term intelligence in the acronym ISR, the two concepts should not be mistaken as synonymous or interchangeable. ISR is something less than intelligence.
Intelligence is an umbrella term that can mean the product resulting from intelligence activities; those activities, including the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information concerning foreign entities and potential battlespaces; or, the organizations that perform intelligence activities. 10 As a product, written or otherwise, Meanwhile, analysis is the development of knowledge from collected information. 16 It is the "thinking part of the intelligence process." 17 Kent thought of analysis as research, which he contended was the attempt to ascertain meaningful patterns from past and present observations.
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Joint doctrine describes it as the process by which intelligence is produced. 19 While collection often accounts for the majority of effort, the analytical function is most central to intelligence.
As one scholar averred, "Analysts and analysts alone create intelligence." 20 And, while ISR may involve preliminary analytics, it should not be confused as being analysis.
Strategy and ISR

Strategic Intelligence and Astrategic ISR
Distinguishing ISR from intelligence is more than semantics. Doing so enables greater precision and deeper thinking on these topics, especially as they relate to strategy. While strategic intelligence exists, strategic ISR does not. Strategic intelligence, according to U.S. joint doctrine, is the intelligence "required for the formation of policy and military plans at the national and international levels." 21 It is, in essence, a product that informs strategy. As an activity, however, ISR is astrategic.
The arguments of two contemporary airpower theorists-Colin Gray and Robert Papehelp bring the relationship between ISR and strategy into relief. Gray, in his work Exploring Strategy, dispelled the myth of "strategic airpower." In doing so, he also provided logical ammunition for slaying the notion of "strategic ISR." Attempting to cleanse the sometimes confused discourse on airpower, Gray averred, "Specifically, the adjective strategic should not be taken to imply any of the following: long-range; off-battlefield (narrowly interpreted as the area of engagement between armed forces); nuclear; important; or earmarked for, or regularly commanded by, a military organization that is labeled strategic." Instead, "Military strategy,"
Gray wrote, "is the art of employing armed force for the political purposes set by policy." 22 Tactics, therefore, refer to the use of the armed forces, while strategic describes the consequences of tactical employment.
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Just as "there is no such beast as 'strategic' air power," there is also no such monster as strategic ISR. 24 Regardless of whether the sensors and their platforms are spaceborne, cyberspaceborne, airborne, afloat, terrestrial, or submerged; whether they pry near or far; their abundance or rarity; their proximity to battle or association with U.S. Strategic Command, ISR capabilities and activities, by themselves, are astrategic. As with airpower, the employment of ISR is the realm of tactics. And, as with airpower, ISR has strategic effect only to the extent its outcomes pertain to strategy.
ISR's astrategic character does not make it inconsequential. If employed thoughtfully, the opposite should almost always be true. Again, the study of airpower provides an instructive parallel argument and some useful historical examples. Robert Pape, in his book Bombing to Win-from which this paper partly draws its title-spotlights the strategic mechanism as the single most important criterion for classifying and evaluating coercive airpower. 25 Tactical variables such as timing, target sets, and the munitions used during bombing are far less relevant to strategic thinking about airstrikes than is the causal chain by which exploding ordinance translates into political success. 26 Pape's admonishment regarding the strategic mechanism transcends his study of aerial 
ISR for Strategic Effect
To understand ISR's relationship with strategy is to understand the consequences of ISR.
Some frequently used ISR categories include traditional or non-traditional; manned or unmanned; armed or unarmed-none of which describe the activity's purpose. Another common typology organizes ISR by collection discipline-e.g., signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence, etc.-which is also how sensors and specialized PED are procured and sustained.
But, this conceptualization of ISR is more relevant to the comptroller than the strategist whose cynosure must be the strategic mechanism. Strategists are most interested in the consequences of activity, and ISR may induce strategic effects in three fundamental ways-by informing, by enabling, and by shaping. When ISR informs strategy, it has a strategic effect. When ISR enables the tactics upon which a strategy hinges, it has a strategic effect. And, when the consequences of ISR employment contribute directly to the accomplishment of political aims, ISR has a strategic effect. What follows is a discussion of these ways and their mechanisms for strategic success.
Ways of ISR ISR to Inform -Collection, Analysis, and Strategy
Collecting the information that apprises strategy is perhaps the most consequential role of ISR. 31 It is also the most insatiable. Informing strategy involves the continuous gathering of data on myriad factors necessary to make sense of the operational environment, to frame and reframe the strategic problem, and to assess the effectiveness of a chosen strategic scheme. In U.S. military circles, it is the collection that feeds the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment. It is the prerequisite for estimates, and for indications and warning. And, it aims to supply answers to the priority intelligence requirements. ISR to inform strategy is, in short, the collection that supplies grist for analysts to mill strategic intelligence.
In this category, analysis is the tissue that connects collection and strategy. As John G.
Heidenrich wrote in his commentary on strategic intelligence, "Without the insights of deep expertise-insights based on detailed knowledge of obstacles and enemies and friends in a foreign area-a strategy is not much more than an abstract theory, potentially even a flight of fancy." 32 The better the ISR, the better the strategic intelligence. And, as Conversely, without collection, analysis is impotent and strategy is blind.
ISR to Enable -Collection, Tactics, and Strategy
The second way that collection may produce strategic effects is by enabling the employment of the armed forces that pursue objectives set by policy. This is the realm of tactical intelligence, threat warning, and combat information. 43 The collection that enhances tactics is central to military action. It is not the singular purpose of ISR, but it does-especially in war-present a demanding imperative for collection resources. Without collection, tactics is aimless; and, without effective tactics, strategy is toothless.
ISR to Shape -ISR Diplomacy and the Observer-Effect
The final way that collection creates strategic effects is by shaping the operational environment directly. Although probably the least examined function of ISR, it deserves a prominent position in the strategist's arsenal. Shaping occurs mostly through two methods-ISR diplomacy and the observer-effect phenomenon. In the latter, the known presence of sensors modifies the behavior of the observed. Through ISR diplomacy, international collaboration may draw strategic ends-or vital proximate objectives-closer. In both cases, shaping provides another plane upon which strategists must consider ISR.
ISR diplomacy describes negotiations between states that are facilitated chiefly by collection-related cooperation. 44 While the sensitive nature of collection methods and means often limits collaboration, sometimes ISR is uniquely suited to influence international politics.
The primary instrument of ISR diplomacy is information-sharing-the release of collected information among partners. Its purpose is international co-optation. ISR diplomacy's ends vary, but they are normally strategic-given the nature of the interstate relationship-and consist of desired outcomes that provide continuing advantage for all involved, such as shared understanding and mutual commitment. 45 Four examples demonstrate the utility of ISR diplomacy and further refine the concept.
In October 1962, as the Cuban Missile Crisis lurched toward the nuclear brink, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson exposed Soviet deceit in a diplomatic coup de grâce before the United Nations, releasing imagery collected from the U-2 and seizing the moral high-ground in the court of international opinion. 46 Between December 1962 and January 1963, the U.S. conducted six U-2 overflights of the Sino-Indian border following Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's request for military aid in the wake of Communist China's overwhelming attacks on Indian frontier forces. 47 The imagery informed both U.S. and Indian policymakers. The cooperation also drew the U.S. and non-aligned India closer together-albeit temporarily-and paved the way for basing agreements in India that promised to extend the reach of U.S. ISR aircraft collecting on the Soviet Union. 48 In addition to ISR diplomacy's salutary effect, collection's observer-effect can also shape strategic conditions. The phenomenon originates in the scholarship of physics and sociology, and occurs when the introduction of observation instruments alters a scrutinized system. 50 Human subjects that know they are watched often behave differently than they otherwise would.
That the known presence of ISR can elicit deception is not the point. 51 Deceit is mostly the analyst's concern. At issue, rather, is how the observer-effect might be used purposefully by the strategist.
Overt ISR can have a positive or negative effect on a subject's behavior. Beginning with the latter, a negative observer-effect-the omission of activity-belongs alongside the idea of deterrence. Deterrence, according to the scholar Thomas Schelling, is the discouragement of action through fear of consequences. 52 It is, in the arena of conflict, a persuasive proposition to maintain the status quo by exploiting the threat of latent violence. 53 The certainty of forceful reprisal-not the presence of ISR-may best explain the absence of battle between two parties uncommitted to peace. Collection assets, by themselves, do not make good peace-makers. Additionally, when a state knows it is under scrutiny, it may choose not to behave in a certain way for fear of being found out. This is the same logic of dissuasion that retail stores use in the obvious placement of surveillance cameras. In the years preceding 2003, Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein elected not to resume weapons of mass destruction production in part because the near certainty of being caught would complicate his efforts to escape U.N. sanctions. 57 The threat of an American invasion, in Hussein's mind, was a distant and unlikely possibility.
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More recently, in 2013, Chinese PLA Unit 61398 ceased hacking activity, albeit an operational pause of just three months, after being publicly exposed by the cyber security company Mandiant and U.S. government officials. 59 The presence of collection capabilities signals some level of awareness and concern by their owners. As well, the prospect of being discovered when there are potential consequences can dissuade undesired behavior. Overt collection shapes the conduct of others.
Collection can also have a positive observer-effect. Like fear and interest, honor motivates state behavior, and the violation of sovereignty-real or perceived-is a proven recipe for confrontation. Peripheral collection by unarmed assets is the most common and benign nonpermissive ISR profile, although it is not without risk. Three unfortunate examples include the 1968 capture of the USS Pueblo surveillance ship off North Korea's coast; the 1969 shootdown of an American EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft by a North Korean MiG-17 fighter jet over the Sea of Japan; and, the previously described 2001 EP-3 incident near China. 60 However, the vast, vast majority of peripheral collection missions occur without incident.
More provocative are penetrations into foreign territory. They can even, in theory, be used to incite conflict. In 1967, according to Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez in their revisionist work Foxbats Over Dimona, Soviet reconnaissance jets overflew Israel's secret nuclear reactor as part of a plan to instigate an Arab-Israeli war that would set back Israel's nuclear program. 61 However, Israel's devastating first-strike scuttled Soviet aims. Another escalatory act involving ISR occurred in 1997 when an Indian MiG-25 reconnaissance jet pilot deliberately caused a sonic boom over Islamabad while returning home, presumably to defy Pakistani counterparts and publicly announce his imperviousness to the compromised air defenses.
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While the strategic efficacy in both 1967 and 1997 is questionable, if there was ever any forethought given, the examples suggest that ISR-in certain circumstances-can purposefully rile an adversary. However, the violation of sovereignty by unarmed ISR aircraft, while it may strain relations, seldom causes war. 63 4. Negotiate regional norms for peripheral collection and intercepts to limit the frequency and fallout of tactical miscalculations.
5. Maintain an aerial ISR fleet to perform overt peacetime informing and shaping activities.
6. Accelerate development of ISR capabilities to enable tactics in high-threat antiaccess/area-denial scenarios and maritime/tropical environments, including lowobservation, long-dwell, wide-area surveillance, and secure data link technologies. 10. Expand joint and service doctrine to recognize ISR's ability to directly shape the operational environment through ISR diplomacy and the observer-effect.
11. Re-elevate aerial ISR in airpower theory, placing it alongside competencies of "strategic" bombing, interdiction, close air support, air combat, and airlift.
Conclusion
ISR is neither intelligence nor analysis. Nor is it strategic or tactical. Conflating these ideas convolutes critical thinking on ISR and limits its potential contributions to strategy. ISR is the collection, ancillary movement and processing, and initial analysis and reporting of intelligence data. But, it is mostly collection.
ISR is also astrategic. More precisely, it is strategic only to the extent its consequences matter to strategy-which is frequent when purposefully employed. ISR brings about strategic effects in three distinct-and sometimes concurrent-ways. First, the collection that informs strategy-making is strategic. Second, the collection that enables necessary tactics is strategic.
Third, the collection that favorably shapes the operational environment-including through ISR diplomacy and the observer-effect-is strategic.
As today's U.S. EP-3 aircraft lift to the sky and turn toward the South China Sea, they do so as part of an increasingly impressive ISR constellation in the Asia-Pacific. But, that sensor network will lack strategic relevance unless resourced sufficiently and employed intelligently. Military and Associated Terms, amended 15 December 2013, 179-180. 11 The construct that is ISR remains amorphous and evolving, and recent Air Force doctrinein contrast to what is presented in this paper-moves toward a more expansive conception of ISR as something roughly equivalent to intelligence. This author appreciates many of the organizational imperatives behind such evolution, but finds utility in precise, differentiated terms and in recognizing the current joint understanding of ISR. See both Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-9, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations, 17 July 2007, 1-2, and AFDD 2-0, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations, 6 January 2012, 1-2.
12 JP 1-02, 183.
Plane; 16 Aboard Die," New York Times, 11 August 1999. As an aside worth further study and possible consideration by strategists mindful of escalation, there may be an inverse relationship between the level of assumed risk in collection missions and the provocation potential of that mission. Manned ISR overflights seem to antagonize more so than unmanned sorties; penetrating ISR riles more than peripheral collection, especially when publicized to domestic audiences; peripheral collection bothers more than stand-off collection, such as from space; and, physical presence, even peripheral to sovereign territory, stokes embers more so than virtual presence, such as through cyberspace. The level of assumed risk may also positively correlate with the level of pre-mission hostility between adversaries.
